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ABSTRACT 
Prior work has established the negative effects of many regulations on business and policy.These negative effects have 
been a key driver for many of the so-called better regulation programmes. Despite all efforts, however, deregulation 
programmes have had inconclusive results and their success remains the subject of ongoing debate. We suggest that the 
public policy efforts have largely overlooked a business perspective of regulation and its institutional determinants. We 
argue that the institutional determinants of regulation include the regulation stock, the quality of regulation and the pre- 
dictability of regulation application. This study is among the first to examine the impact of these institutional determi- 
nants on regulatory compliance costs for firms using a unique dataset from companies in OECD countries. Our results 
convincingly support our approach to the study of regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
Low economic growth and high levels of national debt 
have increased the interest of governments in structural 
reforms to boost competitiveness and reduce unemploy- 
ment. One aspect that often appears in these discussions 
is cutting red tape, that is, limiting the negative conse- 
quences of regulation for business. The drive to reduce 
red tape actually precedes the current economic difficul- 
ties and has received wide attention, especially in Europe 
[1]. In the US the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
following the Enron scandal also sparked interest in the 
costs and benefits of government regulation [2,3]. De- 
spite all efforts, however, the success of regulation re- 
ducing policies is still the subject of ongoing debate. In 
this study we delve deeper into the institutional founda- 
tions of regulation. We argue that an institutional focus 
employinga firm-level perspective is a useful approach to 
the policy debate. We add to existing research by demon 
strating that from a business perspective, regulation 
causes compliance costs due to the institutional setting 
within which a company operates: the stock, quality and 
predictability of regulation. 
Our study focuses on the firm-level compliance costs 
of government regulation. Assessing the situation, Weg- 
rich [1] and Helm [4] conclude that while the volume of 
the regulation research stream is substantial and the theo- 
ries on regulation abundant, current conceptualizations 
and measures of regulation remain inadequate. Accord- 
ingly, the regulation research domain is broad, but it has 
not yet reached maturity and there is a need to reexamine 
conventional wisdom about regulation. The commonly 
held view that regulation constrains entrepreneurship and 
limits welfare has induced policymakers to review their 
regulatory practices. Today, a reduction in regulatory 
requirements is on the policy agenda of almost all Euro- 
pean countries and international organizations, which is 
exemplified by the growth in so-called “better regulation 
programmes” [5]. Despite these programmes, concerns 
remain that regulation is still negatively impacting firm 
activities significantly and that deregulation programmes 
have largely failed [6]. 
In line with public administration research [7-9], we 
suggest that firm-level regulation costs are determined by 
the institutional setting: the stock of existing regulations,  *Corresponding author. 
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its quality and its predictability. As convincingly argued 
in the business literature, managers of private firms form 
cognitive maps based on perceived information and 
events, which subsequently impact on a firm’s strategic 
decisions. We therefore propose that effective policy 
measures need to account for firms’ perspective of regu- 
lation costs and its institutional determinants. We test our 
hypotheses on a large sample of small and medium sized 
enterprises from OECD countries [10]. Our research con- 
text is relevant because firms in these countries are in- 
creasingly exposed to regulation by governments and 
international organizations such as the European Union. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. We begin by re- 
viewing the research that serves as the foundation for our 
hypotheses. We discuss definitions, measures and the 
consequences of red tape in public administration and 
public policy. Next, building on this theoretical back- 
ground, we formulate our hypotheses about the institu- 
tional drivers of regulatory compliance costs. Then we 
introduce this paper’s research methodology, addressing 
issues related to our measurement of the variables. Fol- 
lowing that, we present our empirical findings. Finally, 
we conclude by discussing limitations and offering a 
reflection on opportunities for future research. 
2. Literature Review 
The research tradition in public administration and public 
policy offers useful insights for the development of our 
hypotheses and the empirical part of our study. Both 
adopt the organization as the unit of analysis: the former 
focuses on government organizations, while the latter 
concentrates on private companies. When reviewing this 
literature, at least three conclusions emerge. 
First, red tape (i.e., the negative consequences of re- 
gulation) is best conceptualized from a firm’s perspective. 
Rosenfeld [11] offered one of the first definitions of red 
tape as “guidelines, procedures, forms and government 
intervention that are perceived as excessive, unwieldy, or 
pointless in relationship to decision-making or imple- 
mentation of decisions” ([11]: 603). This definition sets 
out two oft-repeated important characteristics of red tape: 
red tape as excessive regulation and red tape as a percep- 
tion or impression. Public administration research has 
refined Rosenfeld’s definition following substantial pro- 
gress in the empirical study of red tape [12,13]. With 
variations, the definitions largely align with Bozeman’s 
[7] conceptualization of red tape as “rules, regulations, 
and procedures that remain in force and entail a compli- 
ance burden for the organization but have no efficacy for 
the rules’ functional object” ([7]: 283). Red tape is de- 
fined as those rules that serve no purpose at all. It is dif- 
ferent from formalization and rules that may have bene- 
fits (“white tape”). In a similar vein, we argue that the  
cost of government regulation is best analyzed from a 
firm’s perspective. This offers a better reflection of the 
regulatory constraints faced by companies, as well as the 
degree to which these constraints serve no purpose [13]. 
This aligns with Feeney and Bozeman’s [14] conclusions, 
who observe that there is an emerging consensus that red 
tape matters for organizations and this affects firm deci- 
sions and behavior in complicated ways. 
Second, firm-level data collected by means of surveys 
permit managers to respond not just to the number of 
rules and procedures they face, but also to what degree 
they are oppressive or frustrating [8,13]. Business impact 
studies have generated various measurements for the 
costs of regulation, enabling the study of the antecedents 
and consequences of regulation from an international 
perspective. For example, the World Bank’s “Doing 
Business” indicators investigate the degree and indirect 
effects of regulation from a cost accountancy perspective 
[2,15,16]. The Standard Cost Method (SCM) quantifies 
the total costs of administrative procedures [2]. Djankov 
et al. [17] show that the differences in regulation costs 
across countries are substantial and that they hamper the 
entry of new firms and foreign direct investment. This 
research tradition is based on the institutional view, 
which argues that economic growth and wealth ultima- 
tely depend on a country’s institutional framework [18]. 
North [19] defines these institutions as the “rules of the 
game” and formal regulation make up a large part of the 
institutional framework [20]. 
Third, business impact studies and public administra- 
tion research also offer insights for the foundations of red 
tape. If red tape does not serve an organizational purpose 
and is in effect pointless, then why does red tape exist? 
Why do organizations and governments not simply eli- 
minate pointless rules and regulations to set the organiza- 
tion or the business community free? Bozeman [21] of-
fers an initial explanation as to why red tape exists in the 
first place: rules that are viewed as pointless by some 
may be treasured by others. Bozeman [21] also distin- 
guishes two sources of red tape: “rules born bad” and 
“good rules gone bad”. The former result from inade-
quate comprehension, self-aggrandizement and over-con- 
trol. The latter come about through rule drift, rule en- 
tropy, change in functional object and misapplication. 
These explanations all relate to instances where intrinsi- 
cally good rules are applied in ways not originally in- 
tended or to rules whose meaning is lost over time due to 
inertia or a changing environment. 
In a similar vein, Bozeman [21] discusses how politi- 
cal processes can cause rules to be born bad or go bad, 
with special attention to the influence of the US Congress. 
One of the causes of red tape is political compromise. 
The result of political compromise is often vaguely 
worded regulation intended not to inflame important  
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constituencies or interest groups. It is then left to the bu- 
reaucracy to refine the language, often leading to regula- 
tion which includes unnecessarily many exceptions and 
caveats, and which goes beyond its originally intended 
scope. The political process itself also tends to lead to 
excessive demand for regulation. Interest groups demand 
regulation to protect or enhance their interests. These 
groups obtain the benefits of successfully lobbied regula- 
tion and, since the costs are borne by the entire popula- 
tion, the private benefits they obtain exceed their private 
costs [4]. This process causes the level of regulation to 
exceed what is socially desirable, and the majority of 
firms will view regulation as excessive and thus as red 
tape. Finally, excessive regulation is also the result of 
risk aversion and patronage. Politicians are generally 
blamed for adverse incidents through a failure to prevent 
them by means of regulation. They are less often blamed 
for unnecessary regulation. The result is that risk-averse 
politicians have an incentive to supply excessive levels 
of regulation or to require excessive enforcement from 
the bureaucracy. Politicians also have an incentive to 
supply regulations that benefit groups that are important 
during elections. Hence, the political process provides an 
institutional setting where there is excessive demand for 
and supply of regulation, resulting in increasing “exter- 
nal” red tape for private firms and “internal” red tape for 
government organizations. 
3. Hypotheses 
Public administration research and business impact stud- 
ies offer three antecedents of rule production that we will 
use to explain regulatory compliance costs. The existing 
stock of regulation is our first institutional determinant. 
This aligns with the observation that the stock of regula- 
tion is ever increasing, resulting in ever-increasing legal 
requirements and regulation costs for companies to bear. 
The design of regulation is our second institutional de- 
terminant. The inherent characteristics of the political 
process explain the production of regulation that is of 
low quality. The result of compromise can be regulation 
that is vaguely worded or ambiguous. It is then left to the 
bureaucracy to refine and implement such regulation, the 
result of which will be regulation with unnecessarily 
many exceptions and caveats [4]. The predictability of 
the enforcement of regulation is our third institutional 
determinant. Regulation aligns with uncertainty, de- 
pending on how rules need to be applied by firms. Am- 
biguous regulation resulting from political processes 
[4,17] can result in different interpretations. As a result, 
the application of rules can differ across firms and sec- 
tors. 
3.1. The Existing Stock of Regulation 
Various studies following Djankov et al. [17] show that  
the costs of administrative procedures can be substantial 
[16]. The average number procedural steps needed to 
start a business in the sample of Djankov et al. [17] was 
10.48, taking at least 47.40 business days. The costs of 
these procedures were estimated at an average of 47.08% 
of per capita GDP. These costs slow the rate of new 
business entry [22]. The existing stock of regulation is a 
determinant of compliance costs, as the compliance with 
existing rules is a legal requirement on firms. Feeney and 
Bozeman [14], in a study of internal red tape, found that 
those respondents who felt that the focal organization 
had too many rules also perceived higher levels of or- 
ganizational and contractual red tape. There are two ex- 
planations for this. First, if the number of rules that need 
to be complied with is higher, the number of rules felt to 
be excessive or obsolete and their share of the overall 
population of rules will also be larger. Second, the more 
rules a manager needs to comply with, the more likely a 
manager will be to consider this to be a frustrating proc- 
ess resulting in a general opinion that all rules are point- 
less or excessive—rules end up being considered as 
causing red tape even when strictly speaking they do not 
[13]. Taking the above into account, we formulate our 
first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The larger the existing stock of 
regulation, the larger the compliance costs of regulation. 
3.2. The Quality of Regulation Design 
The second institutional variable in our study concerns 
the quality of regulation design. This variable encom- 
passes several dimensions of quality, such as the ease of 
understanding rules and procedures, whether or not it is 
clear which agency to contact and whether the rules are 
designed to achieve their objective as effectively as pos- 
sible. One of the main criticisms of both the World Bank 
and the SCM measurements of the costs of regulation is 
that these treat all regulation as inherently negative and 
do not account for the design of regulation in the first 
place [6,15]. Radaelli [5] argues that “[t]he concept of 
quality has now become a fundamental component of 
regulatory reform and regulatory management in a large 
number of countries” ([5]: 271). Furthermore, DeHart- 
Davis [23] found that well-designed rules are less likely 
to be considered as “red tape” and more likely as “green” 
or “white” tape. Hence, if regulation is well designed, the 
firm-level negative effects of regulation will be lower. 
Additionally, the discussion of “rules bornbad” [21] 
shows that the design of regulation is a key determinant 
of red tape. These are all reasons why low-quality regu- 
lation increases the company’s costs of regulation. Better 
quality should reduce the costs of regulation for various 
reasons. First, if rules are easy to understand and it is 
clear whoin government to contact about them, the time 
spent by business in complying with regulation is re- 
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duced. Moreover, rules that are easy to understand re- 
duce the inclination to seek and the need for outside legal 
expertise. To put it differently: regulation with mediocre 
design increases the costs of “transacting” with the gov- 
ernment. Since compliance with regulation is a “transac- 
tion” that cannot be legally avoided, it raises the costs of 
regulation. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): A higher quality of regulation de-
sign lowers the compliance costs of regulation. 
3.3. Predictability of Regulation Application 
The final institutional variable of our study concerns the 
predictability of the application of existing regulation. 
Intuitively, if regulation is applied consistently and is 
therefore predictable, the costs of regulatory compliance 
for a company should be lower. The consistent applica- 
tion of regulation means that companies, for example, 
will know what forms to complete and how. This reduces 
regulatory uncertainty. Lower uncertainty means firms 
will be less likely to hire outside expertise in complying 
with regulation. Further, the chance of litigation as a re- 
sult of not complying with regulation is reduced. Bertelli 
and Whitford [24] find that rules to be of better quality in 
terms of protecting market mechanisms, if an independ- 
ent regulator enforces them. Independent regulators can 
apply rules and regulation more consistently and pre- 
dictably than regulators who are under political pressure. 
Consistency of application enhances the predictability of 
enforcement of regulation and is one of the characteris- 
tics of green tape identified by DeHart-Davis [23]. As 
with regulation quality, the costs of “transacting” with 
the government decreases if regulation application and 
enforcement is more predictable. Transaction cost eco- 
nomics argues that a transaction characterized by high 
uncertainty should either be internalized or there should 
be unilateral adaptation [25]. By definition, however, a 
transaction with a regulatory body cannot be internalized. 
Therefore, the increased transaction costs due to incon- 
sistent and unpredictable adaptation of regulation have to 
be borne by the firm. This leads to the following hy- 
pothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The more predictably that regula- 
tion is enforced, the lower the compliance costs of regu- 
lation. 
4. RESEARCH METHODS 
4.1. Data and Sample 
The data used in this study derives from the OECD [10] 
study of regulation. The database presents survey-based 
information from nearly 8000 small and medium sized 
firms in 11 OECD countries. It offers information with 
respect to three areas of regulation. The first area is em- 
ployment regulation, which includes hiring and firing  
employees, complying with health and safety standards, 
workers rights, consulting with worker councils or un- 
ions, statistical reporting of employment-related data, 
administering employment-related or payroll taxes, so- 
cial security and pensions, or other mandatory employee 
benefits such as maternity leave and sick leave. These 
second area is environment regulation, which includes 
licenses, permits, planning and environmental impact 
assessments; complying with emission/discharge and 
hazardous substance requirements, process or product 
quality standards, pollution control and product regula- 
tions; environmental reporting and testing, record-keep- 
ing and day-to-day administrative requirements related to 
the environment, such as environmental levies and taxes; 
and eco-labelling of products or processes. The third area 
is tax regulation, which includes business profits tax/ 
corporate income tax, other taxes on capital and assets 
(e.g. dividend tax, property tax), sales taxes (e.g. VAT, 
general sales taxes), and tax deduction requests such as 
PAYE income taxes. These areas of regulation cover the 
most important national and international business rules 
imposed by governments and international organizations. 
The focus of the survey was on firms that employ 500 
employees or less. The choice of these firms as the unit 
of analysis is appropriate for two main reasons. First, it 
has been argued that small and medium sized firms are 
more exposed to regulation than their larger counterparts. 
The performance and strategic decision-making behav- 
iour of small and medium sized firms is more sensitive to 
regulation than large firms. Second, large firms experi- 
ence greater difficulty in responding to a regulation sur- 
vey as no single person or department is responsible for 
compliance with all regulation to which a large firm is 
exposed. Large firms also have international activities, 
further complicating the measurement of regulation. 
The survey was distributed by mail in 11 OECD coun- 
tries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Iceland, 
Mexico, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden. Each firm in the sample received a single ques- 
tionnaire on either labour, environmental or tax regula- 
tion. No single respondent thus provided information on 
all areas of regulation. The overall response rate of 40% 
was satisfactory, with response rates ranging from a high 
of 78% in Australia, to a low of 18% in Mexico and Por- 
tugal, respectively. We pooled the firm-level information 
in one database and used country dummies to control for 
international differences in costs of regulation. This pro- 
cedure ensures a sufficient number of observations to 
obtain reliable estimates of our hypothesized relation- 
ships. 
4.2. Measurements: Dependent Variable 
Our measure of regulation costs aligns with the standard 
cost method. The SCM measurement of regulation costs  
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.                                                                               AJIBM 
Institutions and the Regulation of Business—An International Firm-Level Study of Regulatory Compliance Costs 5
accounts for different cost components of regulation. The 
compliance costs of regulation for a firm are determined 
by a) the number of hours spent by staff and management 
(“Estimate the number of hours spent in an average month 
by staff and management in your business complying with 
regulations”), b) expenditure on computers and software 
(“Estimate your annual computer or software expenditure 
which is principally used to comply with regulations”), 
and c) the expenditure on hiring outside expertise (“How 
much money does your business spend during an average 
month on hiring outside services to comply with re- 
gulations”). To obtain yearly estimates and to obtain con- 
sistency within the second item, we multiplied the first 
and the third items by twelve. Further, in line with the 
SCM method, the first item was multiplied by the hourly 
labour costs per country (firm-level data for hourly labour 
costs was not available). The three different components 
of regulatory compliance costs were aggregated in an 
overall measurement of regulation costs. We used the 
logarithm of these costs to obtain a normally distributed 
measurement of our dependent variable. 
4.3. Measurements: Independent Variables 
We use a composition of two survey items to obtain our 
measurement of the existing stock of regulation (see 
Djankov et al. [17] for a similar approach). The first item 
is a count of the number of government decisions that the 
company had to comply with (“During the past year, how 
many separate decisions or permits did your business 
request from a government to comply with regulations?”). 
However, some rules are more complex and thus need 
more time and attention to comply with than others. A 
single count of regulations would insufficiently account 
for differences in complexity per regulation. We therefore 
used a second item to correct for this. The second item 
measures the degree to which it is feasible to comply fully 
with all relevant regulations, despite their number 
(“Regardless the number of regulations, is it still feasible 
to comply with them fully?”). The first item is a con- 
tinuous variable and the responses range between 0 and 
300. We multiplied this item by the inverse of the second 
item and used the resulting weighted scale as our measure- 
ment for the stock of regulation that a firm faces. This 
means that the number of rules and procedures in the stock 
of regulation will be weighted lower, the more feasible it 
is to comply with them. 
We use respondents’ evaluation of three statements to 
measure the quality of regulatory design: “regulations are 
easy to understand”, “regulations achieve their objectives 
as simply as possible”, and “regulations are consistent 
with one another”. Each was measured on a four-point 
Likert scale, with categories ranging from 1 = “agree 
fully” to 4 = “disagree fully”. These items directly relate 
to Bozeman’s [21] conceptualization of red tape and to 
the characteristics of high quality regulation [4,5]. A 
factor analysis confirmed the uni-dimensionality of the 
three-item scale. The Cronbach’s alpha of 0.71 is above 
the threshold value of 0.70 and is therefore satisfactory. 
We combined the three items into an overall index of 
regulatory design quality. 
We used the respondents’ evaluation of the following 
five statements to measure the consistency and predict- 
ability of regulations, introduced by “thinking about your 
contacts with government offices to obtain decisions or 
permissions on regulations, to what extent to you agree 
or disagree with the following statements”: “officials 
give definite answers”, “it is clear who is responsible for 
decisions”, “the process for appeals and complaints is 
clear”, “decisions are consistent and predictable over 
time and among similar businesses”, “additional or un-
expected payments are not required”, and “you get the 
same view no matter who you contact”. Each was meas-
ured on a four-point Likert scale, with categories ranging 
from 1 = “agree fully” to 4 = “disagree fully”. The items 
directly relate to the requirements of consistent regula- 
tion [5,15,17]. A factor analysis confirmed the uni-di- 
mensionality of the five-item scale. The Cronbach’s al- 
pha of 0.72 is above the threshold value of 0.70 and is 
therefore satisfactory. We combined the five items into 
an overall index of regulation consistency. 
4.4. Control Variables 
We entered various control variables when we tested the 
hypothesized relationships. The first control variable is 
the size of the firm. It is known that the compliance cost 
of regulation is usually a fixed cost, meaning that the 
burden is smaller for a large firm than for a small firm 
[2,26]. In fact, it is suggested that compliance costs are 
the highest for medium sized firms and the smallest for 
very small or very large firms. We therefore include firm 
size and the squared term of firm size in our model to 
account for the inverted U-shaped relationship between 
firm size and compliance cost. The number of employees 
measures firm size. The second control variable is the 
age of the firm. Compliance costs vary with the age of 
the company in its overall lifecycle. Older companies 
will have learned how to deal with bureaucratic proce- 
dures. They are therefore less likely to bear the negative 
effects of regulation and may have developed methods 
and procedures to efficiently deal with regulation [9]. 
The age of the company is measured by an ordinal meas- 
ure ranging from 1 to 3, with 1 indicating firms that are 
less than two years old, 2 indicating firms between two 
and five years old, and 3 firms older than five years old. 
The third control variable is a dummy variable that 
measures whether or not a foreign company owns the 
firm. Foreign ownership could mean that the firm ex- 
periences more compliance costs because it has to com- 
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ply with particular host country regulation that does not 
apply to the home country. Fourth, we control for the 
company’s sector. Regulation differs across sectors 
within a country. Thefirms operate in 16 different sectors. 
We added 15 dummy variables to account for sector dif- 
ferences. Fifth, the firms offered information for each of 
the three main regulation areas (i.e., employment, envi- 
ronment and tax regulations). Differences in regulation 
areas could exist and firmscouldconsider regulatory com- 
pliance costs in certain areas to be higher than in others. 
We include regulation area dummies to control for this. 
Finally, we include country dummies to control for 
country-specific differences in regulation costs that are 
not captured by the independent variables in our model. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Main Findings 
Means, standard deviations and correlations are provided 
in Table 1. In preparation for the regression analyses, we 
performed the usual tests to obtain reliable estimates. 
These tests show that non-normality is not an issue. We 
tested for possible biases caused by collinearity among 
variables by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
for each of the regression coefficients. Calculations of 
VIF ranged from a low of 1.1 to a high of 1.5. The VIF 
values were well below the cut-off value of 10 [27]. The 
pretests indicate that heteroscedasticity might be present 
in the data. We therefore estimated our model with ro- 
bust standard errors, which is the usual solution for this 
[27]. Table 2 presents the regression results. 
We ran a two-step hierarchical regression: that is, the 
three regulation dimensions were added in Model 2 to 
Model 1 with control variables. The dependent variable 
is a logarithm of compliance costs so the coefficients 
denote percentage changes. The various fit parameters 
show that our full model fit the data better. The R2 im- 
proves from 47 percent in Model 1 to 49 percent in 
Model 2 (F = 92.48 with p < 0.001 and F = 93.23 with p 
< 0.001 for Models 1 and 2, respectively). Taken to- 
gether, our results offer strong support for two of our 
three hypotheses and modest support for the other. Table 
2 shows that the existing stock of regulation has a posi- 
tive and strongly significant effect on compliance costs 
(β = 0.021, with p < 0.001). Hypothesis 1 is thus con- 
firmed. The magnitude of the coefficient of the regula- 
tion stock variable is also significant. Depending on the 
ease of compliance, on average, each extra rule increases 
the company’s costs of regulatory compliance by be- 
tween 0.53% and 2.1% (if the number of rules and pro- 
cedures that a firm has to comply with is not adjusted for 
the feasibility of compliance, the results are nearly iden- 
tical). The average firm in our sample faces compliance 
costs of approximately USD 380,000 per year. One extra 
rule increases regulatory compliance costs by approxi- 
mately USD 2000 if the ease of compliance is at its 
highest level (a score of 4) and by approximately USD 
8000 if the ease of compliance is at its lowest level (a 
score of 1). 
Hypothesis 2, predicting that a higher quality of re- 
gulation design will reduce the company’s costs of re- 
gulatory compliance, is also confirmed. The coefficient is 
strongly significant and the sign is negative, as expected 
(β = −0.124 with p < 0.001). The size of the coefficient 
also is large, here estimated at 12.4%. The scale of this 
variable ranges from 3 to 12: everything else being equal, 
the compliance costs of regulation for a firm that faces 
the lowest quality of regulation design (a score of 3) is 
112 percent higher than that of a firm that faces the 
highest quality of regulation design (a score of 12). For 
the average firm this means a difference of almost USD 
425,000. Hypothesis 3, predicting that a greater predict- 
ability of regulation application will lower the compli- 
ance costs of regulation, is also confirmed. The coeffi- 
cient receives moderate support and is negative, as ex- 
pected (β = −0.031 with p < 0.05). The size effect of the 
coefficient is somewhat smaller than that of the quality 
variable, but at 3.1% it is still substantial. The regulation 
predictability variable ranges from 5 to 20; everything 
else being equal, the difference in the cost of regulatory 
 
Table 1. Correlations, means and SDs(a). 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Regulation Costs (log) 2.66 8.20 1.000        
Regulation Stock 5.02 12.03 0.127 1.000       
Regulation Quality 6.37 1.88 −0.027 −0.143 1.000      
Regulation Predictability 11.10 2.70 −0.035 −0.064 0.473 1.000     
Firm Size 67.18 104.63 0.161 0.101 0.011 0.110 1.000    
Firm Size Squared 2.87 0.39 0.088 0.068 0.002 0.089 0.898 1.000   
Firm Age 2.87 0.39 0.031 0.024 −0.054 −0.054 0.070 0.035 1.000  
Foreign Ownership 0.13 0.33 0.124 0.082 −0.031 0.051 0.226 0.142 0.000 1.000 
Notes: (a)Paired correlations of the main variables. 
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Table 2. The determinants of perceived regulatory compliance costs(a). 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Regulatory Compliance Costs Regulatory Compliance Costs 
Regulation Stock  0.021*** 
  (0.005) 
Regulation Quality  −0.124*** 
  (−0.019) 
Regulation Predictability  −0.031* 
  (−0.013) 
Firm Size 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm Size Squared −0.000*** −0.000*** 
 (0) (0) 
Firm Age 0.133 0.109 
 (0.084) (0.083) 
Foreign Ownership 0.309** 0.284** 
 (0.104) (0.102) 
Constant 11.906*** 13.025*** 
 (0.467) (0.473) 
   
Observations 2990 2990 
R-squared 0.47 0.49 
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.49 
F-value 92.48*** 93.23*** 
Notes: (a)†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sector, regulation area and country dummies are included in the 
model. 
 
compliance from the lowest to the highest quality is 
46.5%. For the average firm, this means a difference of 
almost USD 177,000. 
Our results for regulation hold, whilst controlling for a 
large number of alternative antecedents that may deter- 
mine a company’s compliance costs. With regard to the 
control variables, one result is worth mentioning. The 
size of the firm (measured by the number of employees) 
is a significant predictor of the compliance costs of regu- 
lation. Larger firms face higher costs of compliance than 
smaller firms. This effect diminishes somewhat as firms 
grow larger, but not by much (the coefficient for the 
square of number of employees is relatively small). This 
aligns with the firms included in this sample, which all 
have 500 employees or less. Nonetheless, a non-monotic 
relationship between firm size and regulation costs ap- 
pears. 
5.2. Robustness Analysis 
We conducted further analyses to assess the robustness 
of our results. The results were largely consistent with 
the initial results in each of these supplemental analyses.  
First, we disaggregated the data in the three different 
regulatory areas that are included in our study. These 
results support the conclusion that the existing regulation 
stockand the quality of regulation design are important 
determinants of a company’s compliance costs. However, 
the estimated parameter coefficient for regulation pre- 
dictability is only significant in the domain of tax regula- 
tion. Apparently, unpredictability in the application of 
regulation is an important matter of concern for tax 
regulation. Intuitively, this makes sense: for many com- 
panies, compliance with taxation rules will be of the ut- 
most importance, given the penalties involved for not 
meeting regulatory requirements in this area. Firms will 
be strongly inclined to align with tax regulation. The 
unpredictability of application is therefore likely to be a 
greater source of concern with regard to taxation, where 
unintended violations of rules can have more serious 
consequences than in other areas of regulation. Second, 
we disaggregated compliance costs into its underlying 
cost components. All of our hypotheses were recon- 
firmed. We also found that the regulatory structure is 
particularly important to the costs of external support, 
and less so to ICT expenses. Software or ICT costs are  
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usually incidental investments: it is likely that they are 
made in response to structural issues rather than in re- 
sponse to issues that can change from year to year. Third, 
we estimated our models using generalized least squares 
(GLS). GLS is another method that corrects for het- 
eroskedasticity, by weighting the least squares errors so 
that they become homoskedastic [27]. This did not affect 
the results at all. Hence, the regression studies and the 
robustness analyses are strongly convincing and are con- 
sistent with our institutional explanation of regulatory 
compliance costs for firms. 
6. Recommendations and Limitations 
Over time, each country has developed its own coun- 
try-specific regulatory infrastructure. This results in sub- 
stantial cross-country differences in average compliance 
costs for firms. For example, firms in Spain and Portugal 
face regulatory compliance costs 240 times as large as 
those in New Zealand. Previous research has established 
that such differences can explain differentials in national 
economic outcomes [22,28]. Large regulatory burdens 
and restrictive regulation are among the most important 
causes of the economic under-performance and stagna- 
tion of Mediterranean economies compared to other 
countries. 
Our study provides evidence in favour of the hypothe- 
sis that an increase in the existing stock of regulation 
increases the compliance costs of regulation for firms. 
The increase in regulatory compliance costs is greatest if 
firms consider the regulatory burden to already be so 
large that it is no longer feasible to comply with all regu- 
lation. However, even when it is feasible to comply with 
all regulation, an increase in the number of rules and 
procedures faced by firms leads to an increase in com- 
pliance costs of about 0.5%. Therefore, all regulation 
leads to costs and each new rule or procedure increases 
the administrative burden faced by firms. The regulatory 
compliance costs identified in this study are substantial 
and potentially underestimated. A firm that makes ICT 
investments to comply with regulation cannot use these 
resources for alternative and perhaps more productive 
processes. Employees spending time on meeting regula- 
tory requirements cannot perform alternative tasks. Our 
results are an indication to policymakers that any rule 
they design and implement will involve costs for those 
they apply to. 
The results with regard to the quality of design are also 
robust. Whereas it is debatable whether a large stock of 
regulation is beneficial or not, there is less ambiguity 
with regard to the quality of regulation. An increase in 
the quality of regulation lowers compliance costs and is 
of direct benefit to society. The effect is substantial: each 
point increase on our scale of regulation quality (ranging 
from 3 to 12) decreases the compliance costs of regula- 
tion by 10% to 12%. The benefits to society will perhaps 
be somewhat smaller than those to individual firms be- 
cause the process of drafting high quality regulation can 
be long and costly. However, given the fact that low 
quality regulation impacts all firms and that the reduction 
in costs is large, the net effect is likely to be beneficial. 
The robustness tests have shown that the effects of regu- 
lation quality are especially strong for ICT investments. 
The implication is that an improvement in regulation 
quality will free resources that firms can use for alterna- 
tive investments, which in turn can have economic bene- 
fits for the firm and for the country. 
The results with regard to the predictability of regula- 
tion application also lead to interesting conclusions. The 
results indicate that a reduction in unpredictability leads 
to a reduction in the compliance costs of regulation for 
firms. The result of a reduction in unpredictability is thus 
a gain to business, at the costs of extra legislative re- 
sources. On balance, this again is likely to offer net so- 
cial gains, albeit with beneficial effects that are smaller 
than those of an increase in regulation quality. The bene- 
fits firms accrue are approximately 2% to 3% for each 
point increase on our regulation predictability scale 
(ranging from 5 to 20). We found that the effects of regu- 
lation predictability mainly materialize in tax regulation. 
A country with high tax regulation compliance costs 
should focus on the improvement of regulation applica- 
tion in this domain first. 
This study advances the public policy literature by us- 
ing data to investigate compliance costs at the firm level, 
in a cross-country setting. The use of firm-level data is 
well established in public administration research for the 
study of internal red tape and the effects thereof on or- 
ganizational outcomes. Regulation in business impact 
studies is generally studied using country-level data on 
the number of rules that firms have to comply with (ac- 
cording to the official rule book). This study therefore 
expands the latter line of research by examining actual 
compliance costs and the actual number of rules faced by 
firms. Not all firms have to comply with all regulations. 
Compliance and enforcement may be spotty, so that the 
actual number of rules that need to be complied with 
differs from what an analysis of existing legislation 
would suggest. Previous country studies implicitly as- 
sume that regulation is the same for all firms in a given 
country. The data used here show wide variations in 
regulation costs within countries as well as between 
countries. 
This study adds two qualitative dimensions to the 
regulation debate: namely, regulation quality and regula- 
tion application predictability. These are not included, at 
least not explicitly, in previous work on regulation [15]. 
The present study considers regulation as a multi-dimen- 
sional concept. The results show that our dimensions  
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have a significant and substantial impact on the compli- 
ance costs faced by firms. Ignoring such factors will thus 
misinform the policymakers who design measures aimed 
at reducing the costs of regulation. 
6.1. Policy Recommendations and Managerial 
Implications 
This study has implications for policymakers and man- 
agers. The first implication follows directly from the ob- 
servation that quality and predictability are determinants 
of the costs of compliance for companies in addition to 
the stock of regulation. Policymakers who want to reduce 
regulation costs for firms are advised to primarily con- 
sider the design and application of the rules they imple- 
ment, for two reasons. First, policymakers who introduce 
new regulation should be aware that even well-intended 
regulations with social benefits can result in high costs 
for firms. New regulations can result in a net social loss 
if they are poorly designed or inadequately applied. Fur- 
ther, new rules are often created in response to incidents. 
Policymakers anticipating incidents with new regulation, 
often only consider the benefits of these new rules inas- 
much as they prevent the recurrence of the initial incident. 
Regulation is often implemented following incidents that 
never recur. In such cases, the costs of regulation easily 
exceed the envisioned benefits. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
is an example of such a case. Our results are therefore an 
appeal to abstain from incident politics. The design of 
regulation in incident situations is likely to be of poor 
quality due to the short time horizons of policymakers in 
such situations. Incident politics will also result in ad hoc 
regulation without a coherent view of all the regulation 
already imposed upon firms. 
Second, for those policymakers seeking to reduce the 
compliance costs for firms of existing regulation, the 
return on political capital is likely to be higher in terms 
of improving regulation quality or regulation predictabil- 
ity than of reducing the stock of regulation. As Kaufman 
[29] has argued: “[O]ne person’s red tape may be an- 
other’s treasured safeguard” ([29]: 4). Every rule or pro- 
cedure that is removed will meet opposition from one 
constituency or another. Improvements in quality and 
predictability will be largely uncontroversial. A policy- 
maker with limited time and resources can therefore have 
a greater impact on compliance costs for firms by im- 
proving quality and predictability rather than by remov- 
ing rules from the stock of regulation. 
For managers, the implications in part parallel those 
for policymakers. The efforts to influence policymakers 
could focus on improving regulation quality and regula- 
tion predictability alongside and in addition to regular 
lobbying activity to reduce or prevent new regulation. 
The implications for managers also mirror those of poli- 
cymakers in the design and application of internal bu- 
reaucracy. Our study focuses on regulatory compliance 
costs. The constituent parts of this external red tape 
(regulation costs, stock, quality and predictability) can 
also apply to internal red tape with similar causal rela- 
tionships. Finally, our results show that the costs of 
regulation vary between countries, resulting in different 
rates of return of foreign direct investment. Our results 
also indicate that foreign firms face higher compliance 
costs of regulation than domestic firms. These compli- 
ance costs of regulation for foreign firms directly con- 
tribute to the so-called liabilities of foreignness. For 
managers making foreign direct investment decisions, the 
compliance costs of regulation should be an important 
criterion in choosing a new host country. 
6.2. Limitations and Future Research 
Regulation studies have their limitations and our study is 
no exception. These limitations offer opportunities for 
future research. A first limitation concerns our measure- 
ment of bureaucracy by means of regulatory compliance 
costs. As Bozeman [7] has argued, bureaucracy and regu- 
lation detail are distinct concepts and should not be con- 
fused. Our data does not enable the measurement of 
“net” effects of regulation: an ideal measure of “net” 
effects of regulation would account for all the costs and 
benefits of regulation, ultimately measuring only the 
regulation that is meaningless and unnecessary. Future 
research could replicate this study using measurements 
that account for the compliance costs of pointless or use-
less rules. Another limitation of our empirical study con-
cerns country coverage. The sample is relatively large for 
a questionnaire-based study of regulation. The observa-
tions include countries ranging from Southern Europe 
and Latin America to Scandinavia and more An-
glo-Saxon regions. Nonetheless, we do not know if our 
results and conclusions also hold for non-OECD coun-
tries. Future research could replicate our study with data 
from Asian countries or for countries with weak institu-
tional infrastructures such as Russia. The final limitation 
of our empirical study is the cross-sectional nature of the 
database. A panel dataset would enable longitudinal 
analyses and in so doing, the study of whether regulatory 
compliance costs and their institutional determinants 
vary over time.  
New data collection would also enable the study of 
other institutional determinants of compliance costs, such 
as the accountability of the agencies responsible for 
regulation, the degree of regulation enforcement and the 
speed of regulation introduction. For example, if govern- 
ment agencies were accountable for regulation produc- 
tion or regulation enforcement, this would improve both 
regulation quality and regulation predictability, reducing 
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the regulatory compliance costs for firms. Stronger re- 
gulation enforcement will increase regulatory compliance 
costs because firms will ensure that they comply with all 
the regulations they face. The speed at which proposed 
regulation is introduced could reduce regulatory compli- 
ance costs because regulation uncertainty for firms would 
thereby be reduced, preventing unnecessary investments 
in ICT or external expertise required to anticipate am- 
biguous regulation situations. Another avenue for future 
research concerns the costs of compliance due to industry 
standards (such as ISO certification) or self-regulation. A 
study of these compliance costs could be valuable for 
two reasons. First, self-regulation often substitutes for 
national regulation, potentially reducing the overall re- 
gulatory compliance costs for firms. Second, the deter- 
minants and effects of industry standards or self-regu- 
lation can differ from government regulation. 
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, regulation dominates world business and a 
thorough understanding of its determinants remains cen-
tral to public administration and policy research. With 
the above limitations acknowledged, we are confident 
that this study makes an important contribution to this 
line of research by shedding light on the murky world of 
the institutional regulatory environment, and adding to 
our understanding of how the relationships between the 
various dimensions of the regulatory environment and 
compliance costs vary. 
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